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Historical Perspective on the Corporate 
Interest Deduction 
Steven A. Bank* 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the so-called “Pillars of Sand” in the American 
business tax structure is the differential treatment of debt and 
equity.1 Corporations may deduct interest payments on their 
debt, but may not deduct dividend payments on their equity. This 
“ancient and pernicious” feature is criticized because it distorts 
corporate financing choices and inevitably leads to line drawing 
problems as the government engages in a futile chase to catch up 
with the latest financial innovation.2 In the past few years, both 
the Obama administration and new Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman Ron Wyden have proposed capping or substantially 
reshaping the deductibility of corporate interest to “reduce 
incentives to overleverage and produce more stable business 
finances.”3 
 
 * Paul Hastings Professor of Business Law, UCLA School of Law. 
 1 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE CORPORATE TAX 44, 48 (2009); Alvin C. 
Warren Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 
1585 (1974). 
 2 Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine, 
Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 1219 
(2010); SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 48–49. The controversy over the differential treatment 
of debt and equity is long-standing. See, e.g., M. L. Seidman, Deductions for Interest and 
Dividends, in HOW SHOULD CORPORATIONS BE TAXED? 130 (1947); NAT’L INDUS. 
CONFERENCE BD., 2 THE SHIFTING AND EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL CORPORATION INCOME 
TAX 138–41 (1930). 
 3 THE WHITE HOUSE & THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK 
FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 10 (2012) (“[R]educing the deductibility of interest for 
corporations could finance lower tax rates and do more to encourage investment in the 
United States.”); The Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2011, S. 727, 
112th Cong. § 211 (2011) (describing the so-called “Wyden-Coats” reform plan, which 
indexed the interest deduction for inflation and excluded the inflation component from the 
deduction). For other proposals, see Robert C. Pozen & Lucas W. Goodman, Capping the 
Deductibility of Corporate Interest Expense, 137 TAX NOTES 1207, 1207, 1209 (2012) 
(proposing to limit nonfinancial companies to a deduction of 65% of gross interest paid 
and to limit financial companies to a deduction of 79% of gross interest paid); Calvin H. 
Johnson, Corporate Meltdowns and the Deduction of Credit-Risk Interest, 131 TAX NOTES 
513, 513 (2011) (proposing to disallow the deduction of interest paid on debt in excess of 
the risk-free interest, since it reflects credit risk rather than true interest). Former House 
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp and former Senate Finance 
Committee chair Max Baucus also recommended considering modification of the 
deductibility of interest expense as part of reform geared toward lowering the corporate 
tax rate. Pozen & Goodman, supra, at 1209.  
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Over the years, several commentators have attempted to 
make sense of the corporate interest deduction by examining its 
history or have used historical evidence to buttress their 
normative arguments.4 Most recently, Jonathan Talisman, a 
former Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the Treasury 
Department under the Clinton Administration, forwarded a 
historical argument that has not been raised before.5 Talisman 
noted that the corporate income tax was originally conceived of 
as a proxy for a tax on shareholders: “It was viewed as necessary 
to reach shareholders’ intangible wealth and prevent them from 
avoiding tax by keeping profits at the corporate level.”6 From 
this, Talisman infers that the corporate income tax was not 
intended to reach bondholder wealth, since “the corporation does 
not provide a deferral shield with respect to debt. Interest 
generally must be paid periodically . . . . Thus, there is no need 
for a corporate proxy tax for debt to prevent deferral.”7   
This Essay contends that although there may be appropriate 
arguments in favor of maintaining a full corporate interest 
deduction,8 the historical premise for the origins of the corporate 
income tax system is not one of them. Corporate interest was 
deductible both in 1894,9 when deferral was not a concern 
because corporations routinely distributed all of their profits each 
year,10 and in 1909,11 when there was no individual income tax 
and therefore no tax incentive to retain earnings. Moreover, it is 
not that Congress was indifferent to reaching bondholder wealth; 
that was a major subject of the debates in both 1894 and 1909. 
Rather, other priorities—including the protection of leveraged 
domestic industries and concerns about the constitutionality of 
targeting bondholders—took precedence. The corporate interest 
deduction emerged because of expedience, not tax policy per se. 
In fact, the early history of the deduction has more in 
common with modern proposals to cap the interest deduction 
 
 4 See, e.g., Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1094–98 (2000); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and 
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 111–12 (1990); Curtis Jay 
Berger, Simple Interest and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1981). 
 5 Jonathan Talisman, Do No Harm: Keep Corporate Interest Fully Deductible, 141 
TAX NOTES 211, 211 (2013). 
 6 Id. at 215. 
 7 Id. at 216. 
 8 Some of the arguments advocates of the deduction have raised include that it 
helps facilitate capital investment, reduces business costs, and increases returns to 
investors. See Marc Heller, Corporate Interest Deduction Proves Sacred Amid Reformers: 
Taxes, BLOOMBERG, (May 29, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-
29/corporate-interest-deduction-proves-sacred-amid-reformers-taxes.html.  
 9 Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 28–30. 
 11 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113. 
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than it does with the current system of full deductibility. In 1909, 
because of the fear that shareholders could easily shift their 
investment to bonds in order to disguise dividends as deductible 
interest payments, the corporate interest deduction was capped. 
Under the provision, interest on corporate indebtedness in excess 
of the aggregate value of the corporation’s paid-up capital stock 
was made non-deductible. Business lobbying began to chip away 
at this limitation in the post-Sixteenth Amendment revenue acts. 
In 1913 and 1916, the cap on corporate interest deductions was 
raised to the value of the capital stock plus one-half the amount 
of outstanding debt.12 The cap was not lifted entirely until 1918,13 
when it was done so to offset the exclusion of debt from the 
definition of invested capital in the war and excess profits tax. 
Much like today, these early capped interest deduction provisions 
were an attempt to strike a balance between concerns about the 
inefficiencies of the debt/equity distinction and concerns about 
overburdening businesses in industries in which debt financing 
was a necessity. 
Part I of this Essay will discuss the nineteenth century 
origins of the corporate interest deduction, adopted amid 
controversy over the nature of income in the early income tax 
statutes. Part II will focus on the adoption of a deduction in the 
1909 corporate excise tax. It will explore the debates over 
reaching bondholder wealth, which eventually led to the 
insertion of a cap on the amount of the deduction. In Part III, the 
Essay will examine the continuation of the capped interest 
deduction in the first two post-Sixteenth Amendment revenue 
acts of 1913 and 1916, before the cap was ultimately lifted during 
World War I. The Essay will conclude by offering some reflections 
on the historical basis for modern proposals. 
I. 
The deductibility of interest on corporate debt was 
controversial as far back as the first attempt to impose an 
entity-level income tax on corporations in 1894. Although it is 
almost taken as a given today that interest is a deductible 
business expense, while dividends represent a non-deductible 
return on ownership,14 the matter was far less settled at the end 
 
 12 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G)(b), 38 Stat. 114, 173; Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 
463, § 12(a)(3), 39 Stat. 765, 768. 
 13 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077 (1919). 
 14 See Adam O. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity 
Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 122 (1985) (“Apparently, the 
idea that interest payments are deductible as an ordinary business expense is so 
intuitively appealing that Congress has thought it unnecessary to explain section 163(a) 
or its predecessors.”). 
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of the nineteenth century. According to contemporary economist 
Edwin Seligman, who has been described as one of the “pivotal 
historical figures” in nineteenth century American public 
finance,15 “the most advanced tax laws in America, as well as in 
Europe, permit an individual to deduct his indebtedness or the 
interest on his debts, while the corporation is assessed on both 
bonds and stock, or on both interest and dividends.”16 The reason 
for this, Seligman explained, is:  
[T]here is a distinction between individual income and corporate 
income.  In the case of individuals, true taxable property consists in 
the surplus above indebtedness. Net income can therefore be arrived 
at only by deducting interest on debts. But in the case of corporations 
the matter is somewhat different. Capital stock represents in many 
cases only a portion of the property, the remainder being represented 
by the bonded indebtedness.  It is the stock and bonds together that 
represent the property and the earning capacity of the corporations.17 
Such theoretical distinctions may have been influential, but 
there were practical considerations that favored denying a 
deduction for corporate interest. In his State of the Union 
address in 1893, President Grover Cleveland suggested levying 
“a small tax upon incomes derived from certain corporate 
investments” to replace revenues lost as part of tariff reform.18 It 
was clear that he intended to reach income from bonds as well as 
stocks when, in an address before Congress, Treasury Secretary 
John Carlisle subsequently proposed a tax on incomes “derived 
from investments in stocks and bonds of corporations and joint 
stock companies” in order to “most conveniently and justly” 
replace the shortfall caused by Cleveland’s proposed tariff 
reform.19   
Eventually, Cleveland’s proposal morphed into a corporate 
income tax proposal as policymakers sought to harness the 
corporation as a mechanism for taxing income at the source.20  
This meant that both dividends and interest would be taxed at 
the source as well. Thus, noted lawyer and political economist 
Thomas Shearman testified before a House subcommittee in 
 
 15 AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 98–99 (2013). 
 16 EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 513 (2d ed. 1914). 
 17 Id. 
 18 President Grover Cleveland, First Annual Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 434, 460 (1899). 
 19 SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 174 (1980) (quoting 
TREASURY REPORT 83 (1893)). 
 20 This was partly a reaction to concerns about the inquisitorial nature of the 
administration of the income tax during the Civil War and Reconstruction. See, e.g., 
David A. Wells, An Income Tax: Is It Desirable?, 17 F. 1, 3 (1893); William L. Wilson, The 
Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. L. REV. 1 (1894). 
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favor of an entity-level tax on corporate dividends and interest, 
plus all net income from corporate monopolies.21 According to 
Shearman, one of the greatest virtues of a tax on corporations 
was that “dividends upon stock and interest upon the bonds of 
corporations, and, in general, all income which is in any way paid 
through corporations” can be ascertained and taxed “without 
requiring a single return from the persons receiving such 
income.”22 Shearman noted that “every government which 
collects an income tax at all makes it a prime object to collect 
that tax as far as possible through the medium of corporations, 
requiring them to deduct the tax from all dividends and interest 
paid.”23 Not surprisingly given these origins, the House bill in 
1894 did not permit a deduction for corporate interest.   
A corporate interest deduction was only added in the Senate 
bill in 1894.24 The bill’s sponsor, Senator George Vest, a 
Democrat from Missouri, explained that 
[i]f the provision in the bill as it came from the other House had been 
retained, which put a 2 per cent tax upon the bonded indebtedness of 
corporations, we should have heard from the other side of this 
Chamber and from this side such a protest as never was heard before 
in Congress in regard to a tax law.25  
Apparently, the House bill had provoked much outrage on this 
point, with heavily leveraged railroads claiming that the inability 
to deduct the interest expense risked leaving them “in ruin.”26 
Nevertheless, Seligman argued that because of this concession, 
“the definition of ‘income’ was certainly an uneconomic one; and 
that whatever arguments apply to the advisability of making 
corporations responsible for the tax on dividends apply with 
equal force to the interest on indebtedness.”27 
Notwithstanding Seligman’s objections, the distinction 
between the treatment of debt and equity in the 1894 Act was 
likely not viewed to be very significant at the time.  During this 
period, the notion that corporations would defer dividends to 
shield them from taxation would have been considered quite 
foreign. As Republican Senator William Boyd Allison of Iowa 
noted during the debates, “as to the great body of the 
corporations of our country they make dividends covering 
 
 21 53 CONG. REC. 11, 12 (1893) (statement of Hon. Thomas G. Shearman before Ways 
and Means Subcommittee on Internal Revenue). 
 22 Id. at 7. 
 23 Id. at 11. 
 24 26 CONG. REC. 6867 (1894) (statement of Sen. George Vest). 
 25 Id. 
 26 SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 513. 
 27 Id. 
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practically [all] their earnings each year.”28 Similarly, William 
Ripley explained that outside of the railroad industry, “it was the 
common practice [in the nineteenth century] to divide all profits 
in sight and to finance new construction by the issue of 
securities. Such policies were fully sanctioned by the public 
opinion of the day.”29 This was in part because, in the absence of 
robust stock markets or readily available financial information, 
dividends provided an important signal about the stability and 
value of a company, and they were the sole source of liquidity for 
most shareholders.30 In such an environment, there would not 
have been concern about a corporate retained earnings deferral 
shield that would have necessitated an entity-level tax on 
dividends, but not interest.   
II. 
The controversy over the interest deduction continued when 
income taxation was revisited in 1909. The corporate excise tax 
was supposed to reach the “great accumulated wealth of the 
country, or its earnings, engaged in corporate enterprise,” which 
meant that it was a proxy for taxing shareholders and 
bondholders, rather than just the former.31 Therefore, the 
possibility that wealth represented by bond interests would be 
excluded from the tax was considered problematic. The New York 
World reported “[t]here were indications to-day of growing 
opposition to the corporation tax plan. This was chiefly because 
Senators believed bondholders might escape payment of the tax 
while the small holders of stock would contribute all the 
revenue.”32 The difficulty was that in the absence of an individual 
income tax as a backstop to the corporation tax, an interest 
deduction meant that “the ‘bloated bondholder’ . . . escapes 
altogether . . . . Multimillionaires like Mr. Carnegie, whose 
wealth is mostly in bonded investments, go free, while the owner 
of no more than one share of stock in any paying corporation is 
taxed.”33 Similarly, insurgent Republicans argued that it was 
“manifestly unfair to single out corporations whose lists of 
 
 28 26 CONG. REC. 6869 (1894). 
 29 WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 244 (1915); see 
STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE 
INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 51 fig. 2 (2010) (the dividend payout ratio for public 
corporations was approximately 80% between 1871 and 1895). 
 30 STEVEN A. BANK, ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE TAXATION: TRACING THE COMMON 
ROOTS OF DIVERGENT APPROACHES 108–112, 117–18 (2011). 
 31 44 CONG. REC. 3756 (1909) (statement of Sen. Francis Newlands, D-NV.). 
 32 Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, N.Y. WORLD, June 18, 1909, at 
5B. 
 33 Is Corporate Taxation Just, and Will It Aid the Revenues?, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
1909, at 6. 
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stockholders include men of nearly every degree of poverty, while 
wealthy bondholders will be exempt.”34 One constituent wrote a 
letter to Senator Joseph Bristow of Kansas asking, “[D]oes the 
proposition reach the very wealthiest citizens, such as 
Rockefeller and Carnegie, whose holdings are not in stocks of 
corporations, but in bonds?”35 Senator Moses Clapp of Minnesota 
answered, complaining that it “absolutely exempts the man who 
has gone still further in the process of accumulation and has laid 
his accumulated savings in the form of bonds.”36 Senator Albert 
Cummins of Iowa echoed this point, observing, “I do not wonder 
that a man like Harriman should favor this measure rather than 
the general income tax; because the part of his great fortune, 
which has been segregated from the corporations in which he is 
interested, lies beyond the operation of this law.”37 There were 
complaints that this inequity would not only play out on the 
investor level, but on the entity level. As one individual 
complained in a letter to the editor of The Washington Post, 
“[H]eavily bonded concerns doing business in competition with 
those with little or no funded debt would practically escape 
taxation, an obviously inequitable advantage.”38 
Originally, it appears that the Administration and its 
supporters in the Senate had approached the problem as a 
drafting exercise, proposing to solve it through more precise 
language. According to one report, they used the phrase “net 
income,” rather than “net earnings” or “net profit,” in the 
statutory language to avoid the over-bonding issue.39 Apparently, 
courts and businessmen had disagreed about the interpretation 
of the latter two phrases, leaving open the possibility that they 
would exclude from the tax base such “fixed charges” as interest 
on bonds and dividends on preferred stock.40 The New York 
World reported that “the ‘net income’ of a corporation, as 
 
 34 Insurgents’ Fight Will Hold Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1909, at 2. 
 35 44 CONG. REC. 4036 (1909) (read by Sen. Joseph Bristow, R-KS).  
 36 Id. (statement of Sen. Clapp); see id. at 4036 (statement of Sen. Bristow, R-KS) 
(favoring an income tax because “[i]t would then include the bondholders and those who 
have large fortunes that are not reached by this tax. It would more equitably distribute 
the burden as to population than this corporation tax.”). 
 37 Id. at 4038 (statement of Sen. Cummins); see The President Takes a Hand, 
LAFOLLETTE’S WKLY. MAG., June 26, 1909, at 13, 14 (“They [Senators Borah and Bristow] 
could see no reason, however, for exempting from taxation the vast incomes of individuals 
like Carnegie and Rockefeller, only a part of whose fortunes are in the form of corporation 
stocks.”). 
 38 Letter to the Editor, Reaping the Whirlwind: Proposed Corporation Tax Strikes a 
Deadly Blow at Protection, WASH. POST, June 21, 1909, at D6. 
 39 See Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, supra note 32. 
 40 Id.; Editorial, Earnings, Profit, Income, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1909, at 6. Under the 
1894 Act, corporations were taxed on their “net profits or income” and bond interest was 
explicitly made deductible. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. The text of the 
statute may be found in BANK, supra note 30, at 40. 
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interpreted by the president, Secretary Knox, Attorney-General 
Wickersham, Senator Root and Secretary Nagel, all lawyers of 
high standing, is all the money the corporation has made outside 
its operating expenses.”41 The drafters distinguished, however, 
between operating expenses, which were deductible, and fixed 
charges, which were not. “For instance, the tax must be paid by a 
railroad before the railroad board sets aside any of the gross 
earnings for improvements, sinking fund, dividends on preferred 
stock or interest on its bonds.”42 
Requiring corporations to pay interest with post-tax money, 
however, was also controversial. The New York Times reported 
that “[t]he important point, which threatens to cause a real 
division among the [Senate Finance] committee members, is the 
question of taxing that part of a corporation’s earnings set aside 
for the payment of interest on bonds.”43 The dissension spilled 
outside the committee room. Thus, for example, Republican 
Senator Stephen Elkins of West Virginia reportedly spent more 
than an hour discussing the reasons for his opposition to the 
proposed corporation tax in a meeting with President Taft, 
including the inequity of failing to “distinguish between capital 
and capital stock, as some corporations raised all their capital by 
bond issues and had very little stock.”44 Similarly, a group of 
Progressive senators issued a statement declaring that “[t]here is 
no reason for exempting from this tax the vast incomes of 
individuals like Carnegie, Rockefeller, and others, a very large 
part of whose fortunes do not consist of corporation stock.”45 
According to The New York Times, the dispute was largely along 
regional lines. 
The division here, it is understood, is somewhat geographical, the 
Eastern Senators being as a general thing opposed to taxing any 
money connected with bonds, while the Westerners are said to be in 
favor of finding a way to tax such fortunes as that of Andrew 
Carnegie, which consists almost entirely of bond holdings.46 
Even among the provision’s supporters there were concerns 
about the constitutionality of taxing bond interest. In part, this 
related to the so-called “tax-free covenants” on many corporate 
bonds, which had been utilized by railroads and many larger 
industrial corporations to assuage bondholder concerns about the 
effects of income taxation after their experience with the Civil 
 
 41 Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, supra note 32. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Taft Plan for Tax Splits Committee, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1909, at 5. 
 44 Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1909, at 1. 
 45 Oppose Taft Plan, WASH. POST, June 17, 1909, at 1F. 
 46 Taft Plan for Tax Splits Committee, supra note 43. 
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War-era tax.47 Under the 1864 Act, companies were required to 
pay a five percent tax on interest payments, but were authorized 
to deduct the tax from those interest payments.48 In practice, 
however, most corporations chose to bear the tax on interest 
themselves and they were permitted to do so under the original 
Civil War-era provisions.49 Bondholders sought to ensure the 
continuation of that practice by inserting tax-free covenants in 
their bonds. Under the covenants, corporations promised to pay 
principal and interest “without deduction for any tax or taxes 
which the company may be required or permitted to pay thereon, 
or to retain therefrom, under any present or future law of the 
United States or of any state, county or municipality therein.”50   
Given the existence of these tax-free covenants, one objection 
to the proposal to tax corporations without permitting a 
deduction for interest is that the entity-level tax would require 
that corporations reduce the amount of interest by the tax due, 
which could be construed as unconstitutionally impairing a 
contract.51 The response was that the interest could be 
distributed and then taxed to the bondholder, but this could 
violate the constitutional prohibition on income taxation in 
Pollock, which the proposed corporate excise tax had sought to 
elide.52 Moreover, if the interest was paid at the pre-set amount 
despite being subject to tax at the corporate level, there were 
objections that it would effectively 
amount to a double tax. In the first place, the tax would be levied on 
the interest fund itself . . . . [And in the second place, since] in order to 
replenish the interest fund by the amount paid to the government for 
taxation on it, the proportion of net income to be devoted to paying 
dividends to stockholders would be curtailed by the amount of the tax 
on the interest fund.53 
There was some thought given to trying to impose a more 
narrowly tailored withholding tax on interest paid to bondholders 
as a way to equalize the treatment of debt and equity, but 
 
 47 SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 695; A.C. Rearick, Simplification of the Federal 
Income Tax, PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N UNDER AUSPICES NAT’L TAX ASS’N, 1914, at 298, 
303–05. 
 48 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223. The text of the statute may 
be found in THE STATUTES AT LARGE, TREATIES, AND PROCLAMATIONS, OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA FROM DECEMBER 1863, TO DECEMBER 1865, at 283–85 (George P. 
Sanger ed., 1866). 
 49 Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 610, 628–29 (1894); 
Rearick, supra note 47, at 303–04.  
 50 Rearick, supra note 47, at 303. 
 51 Taft Plan for Tax Splits Committee, supra note 43. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Taft is to Fix Tax, WASH. POST, June 22, 1909, at 1F. 
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President Taft later conceded that this idea was scuttled because 
of constitutional concerns: 
[T]he defect was fully recognized by those who drafted the corporation 
tax. They would have been glad if possible to impose a tax upon the 
bondholders who are only less interested in the earnings and success 
of the corporations than are stockholders, but the difficulty of 
including them and of collecting from the corporation before the 
payment of interest on the bonds an income tax proportionate to a 
percentage of interest to be paid on the bonds was that Congress could 
not use a corporation to recoup itself in the payment of such a tax 
from the interest to be paid, because thus to impose a tax on the 
bondholders proportioned to the interest he received would be in 
violation of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
an income tax not apportioned among the States.54 
Given these obstacles, it was not surprising that The Washington 
Post reported that “[t]he proposition to tax corporation funds put 
aside for the purpose of paying interest on bonds has been 
abandoned.”55   
Although taxing bond interest was off the table, the fight 
was not over. The concern was that because of the different 
treatment of debt and equity, corporations and investors would 
take advantage of the relative fungibility of the different 
instruments and evade the tax by substituting bonds for stocks.56 
Senator Augustus Bacon, a Democrat from Georgia, noted during 
the debates over the bill that it was a frequent occurrence that 
the owners of a corporation owning stock convert that stock into 
bonds, and therefore under that conversion, instead of paying 
dividends upon stock they pay interest on bonds, and the exact 
amount which would have been paid upon dividends is diverted to the 
payment of the bonds, which stand in the place of the stock which has 
thus been converted.57 
Bacon noted, “I have seen in the papers, for instance, that one of 
our great transcontinental railroads is now engaged in that very 
process of converting stock into bonds.”58 Similarly, The Wall 
Street Journal reported that 
 
 54 Taft Defends Tax on Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1909, at 7. 
 55 Taft Is to Fix Tax, supra note 53. 
 56 ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 46 (1940). The 
fact that the spread between stock yields and bond yields was relatively small may have 
contributed to the perception of fungibility, although the equivalence could also have been 
ensured through the drafting of the instruments. In 1909, the average yield of American 
railroad bonds varied between a low of 3.605 and a high of 3.727, while common stock 
yields (the actual dividends paid in a year divided by the average of the monthly stock 
values) averaged 4.31. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1789-1945, at 280 (1949). 
 57 44 CONG. REC. 4007 (1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon). 
 58 Id. 
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the United States Steel Corporation converted $250,000,000 of its 
preferred seven per cent stock into bonds bearing five per cent 
interest. It is argued that if this corporation would thus convert stock 
into bonds then it could do so now, and that other corporations 
existing under similar state laws and liberal charters could do 
likewise, and thus convert net earnings into fixed charges and avoid 
the payment of taxes on net earnings as contemplated in the 
recommendations of the President.59 
Because of this concern, at a dinner Taft held for members of the 
Senate Finance Committee to convince them to back the 
corporation tax, “the senators told the president that it would be 
necessary to find some way to prevent corporations from so 
manipulating their stocks and bonds as to evade their tax on 
earnings.”60 
The compromise to this thin corporations problem was to 
permit corporations to deduct interest, but to cap the amount of 
the deduction to an amount of bonds equal to the par value of the 
corporation’s capital stock.61 Senator Elihu Root, a Republican 
from New York who was one of the principal drafters of the bill, 
explained that 
[a]s we found that the bonded indebtedness of the corporations of the 
country does not vary very much from the capital stock as it is now, 
we thought that the simplest and most efficacious way to prevent any 
abuse on any considerable scale would be to introduce into the 
measure the limitation . . . not permitting the corporation to deduct 
from its gross income any amount assignable to the payment of 
interest upon indebtedness in excess of the amount of its capital 
stock.62 
Root’s theory was that the cap would generally limit bonded 
indebtedness from growing beyond its existing one-to-one status 
with capital stock.   
 
 59 Taxation of Net Earnings, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1909, at 8. 
 60 Taft Banquets Senate Finance Committeemen, L.A. HERALD, June 21, 1909, at 1. 
 61 Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1909, at 1; Berger, 
supra note 4, at 220; Michael Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 UCLA L. REV. 
36, 63 n.130 (1968). According to Marjorie Kornhauser, there was no deduction for 
interest in the June 17 draft, but by the June 21 draft it had been added. Kornhauser, 
supra note 4, at 111. Some taxpayer corporations attempted to argue that the value of the 
deduction should be tied to the total amount paid to the corporation even if it was in 
excess of par value, but this was rejected by the courts. See N.Y., New Haven & Hartford 
R.R. Co. v. United States, 269 F. 907, 909 (2d Cir. 1920).  
 62 44 CONG. REC. 4007 (1909) (Statement of Sen. Root). Recent empirical studies 
suggest that the cap was effective, insofar as the average amount of corporate debt 
financing did not appreciably change before and after the adoption of the corporate excise 
tax in 1909 and the individual income tax in 1913. See generally Leonce Bargeron et al., 
Taxes, Investment, and Capital Structure: A Study of U.S. Firms in the Early 1900S (Mar. 
13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2408490. 
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The cap also reflected Congress’s concern about the practice 
of over-leveraging. For corporations that already had outstanding 
indebtedness in excess of the par value of their paid-up capital 
stock or were tempted to incur such sizable debt obligations, the 
cap would serve as a dividing line between legitimate and what 
might have then been considered excessive business debt. New 
York practitioner George Holmes offered this explanation in his 
prominent income tax treatise:  
In limiting the amount of interest which a corporation could deduct 
under [the 1909 law,] Congress evidently had in view the fact that 
some corporations carry a current indebtedness exceeding the amount 
of paid up capital stock and with respect to such corporations intended 
to limit the interest deduction to so much of the indebtedness as did 
not exceed the capital.  It appears that Congress deemed that where 
the indebtedness exceeded that capital it should no longer be treated 
as an incident, but should be considered as a principal object of the 
corporate activities, and that the operations of such a corporation 
were conducted more for the benefit of the creditors than of the 
stockholders.63 
In effect, this suggests that Congress viewed excessive amount of 
debt, or debt that exceeded a corporation’s capital stock, as no 
longer constituting an ordinary and necessary incident of 
business as other deductible expenses. 
There was some concern that corporations could evade this 
limitation by increasing their authorized capital stock with 
meaningless “watered stock,” which prompted drafters to define 
the cap in terms of “paid-up capital stock” so as to make this 
evasion technique costly.64 Thus, the bill provided that “[s]uch 
net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross 
amount of the income of such corporation . . . [i]nterest actually 
paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness 
not exceeding the paid-up capital stock of such 
corporation . . . outstanding at the close of the year.”65 
Progressives and insurgents did not consider the cap to be a 
satisfactory compromise, with Senator Clapp calling the 
treatment of bonds under the corporate tax “badly defective”66 
and still complaining that it “exempts the man with the great 
fortune who has invested his millions in bonds,”67 but it 
nevertheless passed in the final act.68  
 
 63 GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 855 (1920). 
 64 44 CONG. REC. 4008 (1909) (colloquy between Sens. Bacon and Root). 
 65 Corporate Tax Bill Laid Before Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1909, at 2. 
 66 44 CONG. REC. 4009–10 (1909) (statement of Sen. Clapp). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3), 36 Stat. 11, 114. The cap on deductibility of 
corporate interest was subsequently challenged in court, but ultimately upheld. Flint v. 
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III. 
A. 
In 1909, there had been little concern about the deferral 
shield, or the possibility that earnings would be retained by the 
corporation to permit shareholders to evade the personal income 
tax, because there was no individual income tax. Starting with 
the enactment of the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax 
in 1913, however, this was theoretically a legitimate concern and 
one means of reconciling the differential tax treatment of debt 
and equity. Nevertheless, a cap on the interest deduction 
remained in place. 
During the Senate Finance Committee Hearings on the 
proposed revenue bill in 1913, several interest groups submitted 
statements complaining about the retention of the cap on the 
deductibility of corporate interest that had been adopted in 1909. 
J.T. Clark, speaking on behalf of corporations owning real estate, 
argued that the cap systematically disadvantaged such 
corporations due to the fact that 
real estate is mortgaged for two-thirds of its value . . . . Therefore, if 
its capitalization equals the amount of its equity in the property, 
which is most frequently the case, its capitalization is only one-half of 
the amount of its mortgage indebtedness, so that under the operation 
of the pending bill a company will be permitted to deduct only one-half 
of the actual interest it is obliged to pay during the year, because of 
this illogical provision in the bill.69 
Clark contrasted this with the situation in most other large 
interstate corporations where the capital stock generally exceeds 
the corporation’s indebtedness.70 Thus, “large corporations with 
millions of bonds outstanding are permitted to deduct all the 
 
Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107, 151–52, 173–74 (1911) (upholding the corporate excise tax 
itself, but also commenting on the capped interest deduction: “Again, it is urged that 
Congress exceeded its power in permitting a deduction to be made of interest payments 
only in case of interest paid by banks and trust companies on deposits, and interest 
actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness to an amount of such 
bonded and other indebtedness not exceeding the paid-up capital stock of the corporation 
or company. This provision may have been inserted with a view to prevent corporations 
from issuing a large amount of bonds in excess of the paid-up capital stock, and thereby 
distributing profits so as to avoid the tax. In any event, we see no reason why this method 
of ascertaining the deductions allowed should invalidate the act. Such details are not 
wholly arbitrary, and were deemed essential to practical operation. Courts cannot 
substitute their judgment for that of the legislature. In such matters a wide range of 
discretion is allowed.”); see also Anderson v. Forty-Two Broadway Co., 239 U.S. 69, 73 
(1915) (upholding the cap); Realty Company Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1915, at 19. 
 69 Memorandum in Relation to Amendment Sought to Pending Income-Tax 
Bill: Hearing on H.R. 3321 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2078–79 (1913) 
(statement of J.T. Clark). 
 70 Id. at 2080. 
Do Not Delete 10/13/2014 2:28 PM 
42 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
interest which they pay on their bonds,” while, according to 
Clark, the small corporation that owns the buildings leased by 
the large corporations, “is penalized by being unable to deduct 
from the rents paid it by the large corporations the full amount of 
the interest which it has been obliged to pay to its mortgagee.”71 
Walker D. Hines submitted a brief on behalf of a number of 
railroad interests that also argued against the interest deduction 
cap. Hines argued that the concern that corporations would 
evade the 1909 tax by heavily capitalizing themselves with debt 
no longer existed in 1913 because “under the income tax law, the 
persons who receive the interest will pay the tax thereon . . . and 
hence the loss of revenue which was anticipated under the 
corporation excise tax law will not be realized under the income 
tax law.”72 Moreover, Hines contended that the possibility of 
using leverage to evade the income tax was minimal due to the 
bankruptcy risk of heavy leverage and due to the fact that  
[a]t the present time no corporation can put forward any bond with 
the hope that it will be attractive unless the bond contains a provision 
supposed to mean that the interest will be paid free of any tax which 
may be required to be paid or deducted at the source.73   
At the same time, the issue of reaching bondholder wealth 
was still prominent in policy discussions. The bill’s authors 
reportedly designed the measure to “reach the rich man and be 
effective in equalization of taxation.”74 At the time, Andrew 
Carnegie was in the news for reportedly retiring with $213 
million worth of bonds in the newly formed United States Steel 
Corporation, all of which would be exempt from taxation under 
New York state property law after paying a one-time recording 
tax.75 Moreover, beyond the sensationalism of individual massive 
bond wealth was the reality that corporation bonds were an 
important part of corporate financing at this time, with the gross 
amount of corporate bonds outstanding equaling $17.4 billion in 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Some Suggestions and Comments, on Behalf of Certain Railroad Companies, 
Relative to the Provisions of the Income Tax Section of H.R. 3321, Regulating the 
Ascertainment of the Net Income of Corporations: Hearing on H.R. 3321 Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2058–59 (1913) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of 
Walker D. Hines). Indeed, the existence of the income tax led Hines to point out that the 
cap would result in double taxation on the non-deductible portion of the interest. Id. at 
2060; see also Letter to the Editor, Double Income Taxation, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1913, at 
10. 
 73 Hearings, supra note 72, at 2062. 
 74 Taxes Piled Up in Succession Under Operation of Income Bill, WALL ST. J., June 
20, 1913, at 1. 
 75 Financial News for the Investor, AM. REV. REVIEWS, July–Dec. 1913,  at 126. New 
York’s so-called “secured debt” exemption only added to the confusion among investors 
trying to understand the tax consequences of holding bonds at this time. See Bonds and 
Taxes, MUNSEY’S MAG., Apr.–Sept. 1913, at 421, 423.   
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1913, compared to only $5.6 billion in combined tax-exempt 
federal and state bonds.76 
Ultimately, Congress elected to raise the interest cap rather 
than eliminate it. In the Senate Finance Committee, the ceiling 
on deduction of interest was increased from an amount equal to 
the paid-up capital stock to an amount “not exceeding one-half of 
the sum of its interest bearing indebtedness and its paid-up 
capital stock outstanding at the close of the year.”77 There was 
some confusion about the construction of this clause.  Treasury 
initially interpreted this to mean that the capital stock and the 
debt should be added together and then cut in half to arrive at 
the amount of debt for which interest may be deducted.78 
Corporations were even instructed to calculate their interest this 
way on their returns.79 Nevertheless, Treasury soon changed its 
stance and issued a ruling to explain that it would construe the 
language as the paid up capital stock, plus one-half of the 
outstanding debt.80 This confusion only underscores the 
arbitrariness of the number chosen for the ceiling on the interest 
deduction. Seligman called it a compromise ”more favorable to 
the corporations than was the excise tax,” but one that was 
“entirely arbitrary. Either there should have been no deduction 
at all, or the deduction should have been permitted on all the 
indebtedness which might be regarded as a result of purely 
consumption credit.”81 
B. 
After 1913, Congress was subjected to “several years of 
intensive lobbying by corporate interests” on the subject of the 
corporate interest deduction.82 Some argued that the interest cap 
was hard to justify in a post-Sixteenth Amendment world. 
Representative J. Swagar Sherley, a Democrat from Kentucky, 
asked Chairman Cordell Hull whether the Ways and Means 
Committee “had considered the simplification of the law by 
providing that the corporation should do as individuals do, and 
that all interest paid should be considered as an expense of doing 
business.”83 As Sherley explained, “I can see why, when you do 
 
 76 GEORGE E. LENT, THE OWNERSHIP OF TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES, 1913–1953, at 10 
tbl. 1 (1955). 
 77 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 114, 173; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 
56, at 84. 
 78 New Income Tax Returns Necessary from Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 
1914, at 1. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1, 7; T.D. 1960, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 43 (1914). 
 81 SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 685. 
 82 Berger, supra note 4, at 221 n.32.  
 83 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sherley). 
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not tax individuals but only tax corporations, you should have a 
particular provision touching interest payments. But now you are 
taxing both the corporation and the individual . . . .”84 Railroad 
lawyer Alfred Thom echoed these sentiments in a brief he 
submitted to the Senate Finance Committee during the 
consideration of the 1916 Act: 
It is difficult to appreciate the reason for any arbitrary limitation on 
interest in calculating net income as would be the case in any expense 
incident to the business, and no satisfactory reason has been assigned. 
The present provision has apparently been taken over from the old 
corporation excise law without consideration of the effect of the 
establishment of a net income tax on individuals.85   
One impetus for change was the continuing perception that 
the cap on the deductibility of interest payments was effectively 
hitting either common stockholders with a second or third layer 
of tax or consumers in the form of higher prices, rather than 
reaching bondholder wealth. This was partly due to the 
continued presence of tax-free covenants and other structural 
features of the bond instruments that prevented corporations 
from factoring in the deductibility cap into previously issued 
bonds. Harvard Economics Professor Charles Bullock wrote that 
“[a]t present the average corporation is obliged to assume 
payment of the ordinary tax upon bond interest . . . . It therefore 
comes about, if the tax is not shifted, that the holders of common 
stock may be taxed at two or three times the ordinary rate.”86 
These tax-free covenants had expanded far beyond the original 
confines of those enacted as a result of the Civil War-era income 
tax: 
The language of the typical “tax-free” clause, however, framed at the 
instance of creditors who demanded protection against every possible 
contingency in the premises, is, in its usual form, so broad as 
apparently to comprehend not only an excise tax upon the business of 
the corporation deductible against its security-holders but a tax like 
the present income tax which is levied, not upon the corporation, but 
upon the recipient of the interest, and which solely, as a means of 
collection, the corporation is required to withhold and to pay to the 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Brief of Alfred P. Thom in Regard to the Duplicate Taxation of the Holders of 
Common Stock by the Pending Revenue Act, in BRIEFS AND STATEMENTS FILED WITH THE 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, 64TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ON H.R. 16763 
75, 76 (1916). 
 86 Charles J. Bullock, Financing the War, 31 Q.J. ECON. 357, 374 (1917); see W. Elliot 
Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. 
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 173, 197 (1985) (describing practice of tax-free covenants). But see Roy G. 
Blakey, Amending the Federal Income Tax, 58 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 32, 38 
n.4 (1915) (arguing that the tax burden was properly on corporations or shareholders 
because the tax burden was built in to the higher price the corporation received for the 
bond).  
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government . . . . The result has been a tax which Congress intended 
to levy upon the income-receiver has, in this case, been shifted to the 
income-producer. It thus falls not upon the “swollen fortune” which it 
is the professed purpose of this act particularly to reach, but primarily 
upon the corporation and finally upon the unfortunate “ultimate 
consumer” who was supposed already to be more than sufficiently 
taxed.87 
This meant that one argument for differentiating between the 
cap in 1909 and the cap post-1913—that the individual income 
tax would ensure that bondholders paid their fair share of tax on 
the interest payments—may not have been entirely accurate. In 
effect, permitting the corporation to deduct interest payments 
may have become a way to ensure the corporation (or its 
stockholders, customers, or whoever bore the ultimate burden) 
would not pay the tax twice, since its bondholders were already 
being spared one layer of tax as a result of the covenants.88 
In 1916, Congress was not ready to abandon the cap 
completely, but it was willing to further the effort begun in 1913 
to raise it. Thus, a bill was introduced to permit corporations to 
deduct interest on an amount of debt equal to twice its capital 
stock. As Chairman Hull explained, this was once again a 
compromise relating to concerns about the fungibility of debt and 
equity: 
[T]he original theory of the matter was that corporations could issue 
quite a lot of watered stock, transfer that into bonds, mortgage their 
property, and incur interest, and make a great many shifts in many 
ways that would result in avoiding the real purpose of the law. This 
bill allows them to deduct interest on an amount of indebtedness 
double their capital stock.89 
As Hull explained, “[t]he original provision was modified, but it 
was not thrown wide open.”90   
Congress did not adopt the same cap proposed in the House 
bill, but it did employ language to ratify the more generous 
interpretation employed by Treasury starting in 1914. Thus, 
under the Revenue Act of 1916, it revised the statutory language 
to make clear that corporations were permitted to deduct the 
interest on an amount of debt equal to the paid-up capital stock 
 
 87 Rearick, supra note 47, at 304. 
 88 The Senate Finance Committee in 1916 also sought to ameliorate the problem by 
prohibiting tax-free covenants for future bond issuances, but ultimately simply barred the 
deductibility of income tax payments made as a result of such guarantees. See Brownlee, 
supra note 86, at 201; see also Cedric A. Major, The Revised Federal Income Tax Law, 2 
CORNELL L.Q. 73, 87 (1917). 
 89 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916) (statement of Sen. Hull). 
 90 Id. 
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and one-half the outstanding indebtedness.91 While this fell far 
short of the critics’ arguments for repeal, it laid the groundwork 
for a push to eliminate the cap completely a few years later.   
The entry of the United States into the war and the adoption 
of war and excess profits taxes in 1917 had complicated the 
question of the corporate interest deduction. In its definition of 
an “invested capital” base upon which to measure “excess profits” 
and “war profits” for purposes of levying a tax, Congress had 
omitted most borrowed funds.92 The New York Times argued that 
this was inequitable since “all funds used in business, and at the 
risk of business, are capital for that purpose in an economic 
sense.”93 The Times suggested that “[a] small step toward solving 
the problem would be to remove, or at least to enlarge, the limit 
upon the allowance deductible for interest before calculating the 
tax.”94 As George Holmes explained, the interest cap’s 
arbitrary limitation resulted in the creation of a fictitious income on 
which the corporation was taxed, and since such fictitious income not 
only was subject to a heavy income tax but entered very materially 
into the computation of an extraordinarily heavy excess profits tax, 
the provision operated with rank injustice in the case of corporations 
which had an indebtedness greatly in excess of their capital stock.95 
In 1918, the House Ways and Means Committee used similar 
reasoning in a report recommending a repeal of the cap96: “Since 
borrowed money is not allowed to be included in computing 
invested capital for the purpose of the war profits and excess 
profits tax, it seems only fair to allow as a deduction in 
computing net income the whole amount of the interest paid 
during the year.”97 Under the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress 
adopted this logic and interest on corporate debt became fully 
deductible for the first time.98 This move was considered 
momentous and hailed by businesses and practitioners, where 
the cap had not only limited deductibility, but also caused 
significant confusion for corporate taxpayers.99 As The Wall 
 
 91 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, tit. I, § 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 768 (“The amount of 
interest paid within the year on its indebtedness to an amount of such indebtedness not in 
excess of the sum of (a) the entire amount of the paid-up capital stock outstanding at the 
close of the year, or, if no capital stock, the entire amount of capital employed in the 
business at the close of the year, and (b) one-half of its interest-bearing indebtedness then 
outstanding . . . .”); see Revenue Bill Amended, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1916, at XX2. 
 92 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, EXCESS PROFITS TAX PROCEDURE 108 (1920). 
 93 Taxation of Borrowed Capital, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1918, at 12. 
 94 Id. 
 95 HOLMES, supra note 63, at 856. 
 96 Retains Taxation on Issues of Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1918, at 17. 
 97 H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 12–13 (1918). 
 98 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077 (1919). 
 99 See, e.g., Income Tax Allowance with Respect to Interest: Where Indebtedness 
Exceeds the Capital, Month to Month Variations Must Be Taken into Account, WALL ST. J., 
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Street Journal had commented when the repeal of the cap was 
before the Ways and Means Committee, “[h]alf-way concessions 
[on the interest deduction cap] . . . were made in the present law, 
but the new bill contains the first full measure of justice to 
corporations” on this issue.100 Similarly, The New York Times 
hailed the change: “Considering that all interest paid by 
corporations is subject to tax as income of those to whom it is 
paid, the limitation in the old law likewise resulted in double 
taxation to the extent that a corporation was not permitted to 
deduct interest in arriving at net taxable income.”101  
CONCLUSION 
The capped origin of the corporate interest deduction 
contradicts the notion that a full interest deduction was part of 
the original design of the corporate income tax. Indeed, there was 
significant concern about bondholder wealth and tax evasion as a 
result of the fungibility of debt and equity in 1909, and this 
concern continued even after an individual income tax was 
enacted. The cap on the interest deduction, although criticized as 
“logically indefensible,”102 reflected a pragmatic compromise 
between those concerned that corporations would become 
over-leveraged to avoid the entity-level tax and those concerned 
that not permitting an interest deduction would unfairly 
disadvantage corporations that needed such leverage. It was only 
removed when the larger issue of taxing wartime profits made 
the tax treatment of heavily leveraged companies more 
problematic. 
This historical context also provides perspective for modern 
advocates of a cap on the corporate interest deduction. For 
instance, Senator Wyden justifies the proposal contained in his 
bill with Republican Senator Dan Coats on similar grounds of 
over-leverage and the ease of shifting between equity and debt. 
According to the information statement on the bill, the cap is 
justified as necessary to “create[] a more even playing field 
between corporate debt and equity by cutting the value of 
inflation from a corporation’s interest deduction on debt.”103 The 
statement continues to note that “[c]utting the value of this tax 
 
June 10, 1918, at 4; Answers to Inquirers; War Revenue Problems, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 
1918, at 2; Borrowed Funds Allowable as Capital in Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1918, at 
4; ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 584 (1920). 
 100 The Revenue Bill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1918, at 1. 
 101 Shows Injustices of Revenue Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1919, at 29. 
 102 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 459 (1919). 
 103 RON WYDEN & DAN COATS, THE BIPARTISAN TAX FAIRNESS AND SIMPLIFICATION 
ACT OF 2011, available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden-Coats% 
20Two% 20Pager%20FINAL1.pdf. 
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